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Abstract International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) allow managers
flexibility in classifying interest paid, interest received, and dividends received
within operating, investing, or financing activities within the statement of cash
flows. In contrast, U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
requires these items to be classified as operating cash flows (OCF). Studying
IFRS-reporting firms in 13 European countries, we document firms’ cash-flow
classification choices vary, with about 76, 60, and 57% of our sample classi-
fying interest paid, interest received, and dividends received, respectively, in
OCF. Reported OCF under IFRS tends to exceed what would be reported under
U.S. GAAP. We find the main determinants of OCF-enhancing classification
choices are capital market incentives and other firm characteristics, including
greater likelihood of financial distress, higher leverage, and accessing equity
markets more frequently. In analyzing the consequences of reporting flexibility,
we find some evidence that the market’s assessment of the persistence of
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operating cash flows and accruals varies with the firm’s classification choices
and the results of certain OCF prediction models are sensitive to classification
choices.
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1 Introduction
We examine the determinants and consequences of comparative flexibility in
classification choices within the statement of cash flows. International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) are perceived to allow managers more flexibility
than generally accepted accounting principles in the United States (U.S.
GAAP). This increased flexibility is apparent with regard to classifications
within the statement of cash flows. U.S. GAAP requires that firms classify
interest paid, interest received, and dividends received as operating cash flows.
In contrast, IFRS allows firms the flexibility to report these items as operating
cash flows (OCF) or as investing or financing. We describe variation in firms’
cash-flow classification choices under IFRS, identify capital market incentives
and firm reporting environment characteristics associated with these choices,
and document consequences of classification flexibility.
Cash flow, and particularly OCF, is well established as a basis for business
valuation (e.g., Damodaran 2006; Imam et al. 2008),1 contracting (e.g., Dichev
and Skinner 2002; Mulford and Comiskey 2005), and financial analysis (e.g.,
Estridge and Lougee 2007). Although an extensive literature examines classifi-
cation shifting within the income statement and the balance sheet (Engel et al.
1999; Marquardt and Wiedman 2005; McVay 2006; Bartov and Mohanram
2014), less attention has been given to classification variations within the
statement of cash flows (Lee 2012) and classification restatements (Hollie
et al. 2011). IFRS reporting provides a setting where the accounting standards
provide firms flexibility in classification choices within the statement of cash
flows.
The effect of flexibility in cash-flow classification and its consequences
matter because both the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) share the objective that financial
information should enable financial statement users to better predict future cash
1 Imam et al. (2008) present evidence that discounted cash flow models and price earnings multiples are the
valuation models most preferred by analysts. Liu et al. (2007, 56), who present evidence that earnings
multiples dominate cash flow multiples in predicting share price, nonetheless note that many practitioners
prefer to use cash flows rather than earnings as a basis for valuation using multiples. Practitioners, these
scholars say, argue Bthat accruals involve discretion and are often used to manipulate earnings. . . . And
expenses such as depreciation and amortization deviate substantially from actual declines in value because
they are based on ad hoc estimates that are, in turn, derived from potentially meaningless historical costs.^
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flows.2 Furthermore, both boards articulate the importance of accrual and cash
flow information in achieving this objective. The IASB articulates its position
as follows.
Information about a reporting entity’s cash flows during a period also helps users
to assess the entity’s ability to generate future net cash inflows. It indicates how
the reporting entity obtains and spends cash, including information about its
borrowing and repayment of debt, cash dividends or other cash distributions to
investors, and other factors that may affect the entity’s liquidity or solvency.
Information about cash flows helps users understand a reporting entity’s opera-
tions, evaluate its financing and investing activities, assess its liquidity or sol-
vency and interpret other information about financial performance.3
Despite identical objectives, standard setters have established different requirements for
presentation of certain items—interest paid, interest received, and dividends received—in
the statement of cash flows. As a consequence, the amount of OCF reported by a given
entity can differ under U.S. GAAP and IFRS. Theoretically, the appropriate classification
of these items is open to debate. Evenwhen deliberating on the adoption of the statement of
cash flows standard, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 95 (SFAS 95),
members of the FASB discussed the classifications of interest paid and interest received,
ultimately opting to require these items be reported in the operating section.4
We initially document variation in classification choices within a hand-collected
sample of 798 nonfinancial IFRS firms in 13 European countries from 2005 to 2012.
About 76, 60, and 57% of the sample classifies interest paid, interest received, and
dividends received, respectively, in OCF. Only about 42% of the sample firms that
report all three items opt to classify all three in OCF. We document significant variation
in classification across industries and most countries.
The first set of analyses focuses on firms’ classification choices and the
effect on reported OCF. Results indicate that reported OCF tends to be higher
under IFRS than it would have been under U.S. GAAP. Similarly, investing and
2 In IFRS, the Conceptual Framework, Chapter 1, The Objective Of General Purpose Financial Reporting
¶OB3 states: BDecisions by existing and potential investors about buying, selling or holding equity and debt
instruments depend on the returns that they expect from an investment in those instruments, for example
dividends, principal and interest payments or market price increases. Similarly, decisions by existing and
potential lenders and other creditors about providing or settling loans and other forms of credit depend on the
principal and interest payments or other returns that they expect. Investors’, lenders’ and other creditors’
expectations about returns depend on their assessment of the amount, timing and uncertainty of (the prospects
for) future net cash inflows to the entity. Consequently, existing and potential investors, lenders and other
creditors need information to help them assess the prospects for future net cash inflows to an entity.^ In U.S.
GAAP, Concepts Statement No. 8 ¶ OB3 is identical.
3 IFRS Conceptual Framework, Chapter 1, ¶OB20, which is identical to U.S. GAAP, Concepts Statement No.
8 ¶ OB20.
4 Even though U.S. GAAP requires interest paid and interest received to be reported as operating cash flows,
paragraphs 88–90 in the basis of conclusions of SFAS 95 BStatement of Cash Flows^ (FASB 1987) discuss the
debate over the classification of interest paid and interest received during the deliberation preceding the
adoption of the standard. See Nurnberg and Largay (1998) for a historical perspective on aspects of the debate.
SFAS 95 is now codified in the FASB Accounting Standards Codification (ASC Sections 230 Statement of
Cash Flows, 830 Foreign Currency Matters, and 942 Financial Services – Depository and Lending.)
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financing cash flows would generally have been lower under IFRS. The pair-
wise means, by firm, for the three cash flow amounts under IFRS versus U.S.
GAAP differ significantly.
The second set of analyses focuses on determinants of firms’ cash-flow classification
choices from the perspective of OCF-increasing classifications. We examine incentives
to inflate reported OCF, similar to the work of Lee (2012), including capital market
incentives, financial distress, the presence of analysts’ cash flow forecasts, and profit-
ability. Furthermore, we explore characteristics associated with the reporting environ-
ment, such as analyst following, classification choices of industry peers, cross-listing in
the U.S., country, and industry.
In our determinants analysis, we construct two dependent variables as proxies
for OCF-increasing classification choices: (1) the amount of the difference in
reported OCF under IFRS and a benchmark measure of what OCF would have
been under U.S. GAAP and (2) an indicator variable signifying a classification
choice that would increase OCF under IFRS relative to U.S. GAAP. For the first
of these variables, we create a hypothetical benchmark by adjusting each firm’s
OCF to include interest paid, interest received, and dividends received (i.e.,
consistent with U.S. GAAP requirements). That is, we consider a hypothetical
U.S. GAAP benchmark, assuming that managers’ real operating activities would
have remained the same even if cash-flow classification choices had been
restricted. We do not assert these items are appropriately classified as OCF.
Rather, we use U.S. GAAP classification as a benchmark because our main
focus is on the differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS. For the second of
these dependent variables, we focus on the classification choice for one item,
interest paid, which IFRS permits to be classified either in the operating or the
financing section of the statement of cash flows. We focus on interest paid
because it usually constitutes a relatively large amount relative to interest re-
ceived and dividends received, is commonly reported, is typically reported
separately, and is thus easier to identify. A firm may have more control over
the amount and timing of cash outflows (i.e., payments), as opposed to cash
inflows (i.e., receipts), thus making interest paid more susceptible to use as an
OCF-increasing item. 5 When a firm classifies interest paid as financing, it
follows that, ceteris paribus, reported OCF will be higher than if interest paid
had been classified as operating. Thus classification of interest paid as financing
is an OCF-increasing classification choice.
A cross-sectional determinants analysis of all firms with consistent classification
during the study period indicates that actually reported OCF exceeds benchmark-OCF
by a greater amount for firms with weaker financial positions (i.e., greater likelihood of
financial distress, higher leverage, and lower profitability). Firms with higher amounts
of equity-raising activity also make greater OCF-increasing classification choices. For
the determinants analysis using an indicator variable signifying classification choice,
we find that firms with higher leverage are more likely to make an OCF-enhancing
choice and firms cross-listed in the United States are more likely to make a classifica-
tion choice that is consistent with U.S. GAAP. We find no effects related to homoge-
neity of industry practice or to the presence of analysts’ cash flow forecasts.
5 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this observation.
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An examination of 99 firms that change classifications during our sample period
reveals that 58% make OCF-increasing classification choices. The most common
change is a reclassification of interest paid out of operating, an OCF-increasing choice.
Analysis indicates that an OCF-increasing reclassification is more likely for firms with
greater equity issuance and less likely for firms with more analyst coverage, homoge-
neity of industry practice, and a cross-listing in the U.S.
Variation in classification of cash flow items also introduces noncomparability into
measurement of widely used metrics, such as accruals and free cash flow.6 Therefore
the final set of analyses focuses on consequences of flexibility in classification choice.
The first consequence we examine pertains to the market pricing of persistence of cash
flows and accruals. We examine whether the persistence of cash flows and accruals
differs for firms that report consistent with U.S. GAAP, compared to those making
classification choices permitted under IFRS. We find some evidence of differences in
accrual pricing between the group of firms reporting consistent with U.S. GAAP and
those using the classification flexibility allowed under IFRS, but results are sensitive to
model specification.
A second consequence we examine pertains to models for predicting cash flows that
have been used in accounting research. We find that differences in cash classification
choices affect results when the cash flow prediction model is based on sales (Dechow
et al. 1998; Roychowdhury 2006) but not when the cash flow prediction model is based
on cash flows (Barth et al. 2001; Givoly et al. 2009). One implication is that the latter
type of model may be more useful in the international context in which flexibility in
cash-flow classification exists.
Our study contributes to literature on managerial discretion in the use of non-earnings
measures, especially in an international context. Although managerial discretion in cash-
flow classification could help financial statement users, our evidence suggests that
classification choices are associated with incentives to report higher OCF. We also find
that the likelihood of making an OCF-increasing change in classification is positively
associated with equity issuance but negatively associated with analysts’ coverage, con-
sistent with analysts serving some deterrent role. Similarly, being cross-listed in the U.S.
decreases the likelihood of making a cash-flow classification change.
Our study also contributes to the debate over costs and benefits of comparability and
uniformity (De Franco et al. 2011). Flexibility in cash flow reporting may result in
lower comparability and uniformity and thus may create significant costs for users
because of the use of cash flows in valuation and contracting.7 We provide evidence
that the market pricing of the persistence of accruals and cash flows differs, depending
on the cash-flow classification choices made. While flexibility in cash-flow
6 Accruals are sometimes measured as the difference between earnings and cash flows from operating
activities, and free cash flow is often measured as operating cash flow minus capital expenditures. The
alternative Hribar and Collins (2002) measure of accruals based on the balance sheet, even if superior, is not
always feasible in an international setting.
7 For example, Portugal Telecom reported 2006 OCF of €1,788. Interest paid of €569 was classified as
financing, and interest received of €239 and dividends received of €36 were classified as investment activities.
Overall, OCF would have been 16% lower under U.S. GAAP than as reported under IFRS. This illustrates the
significance of cash-flow classification choices. An analyst covering Portugal Telecom and U.S. telecommu-
nications companies or even other European telecommunication companies, such as Deutsche Telekom AG
(which in 2006 classified dividends received, interest paid, and interest received all in operating), would have
had to address noncomparability in financial ratios and in OCF-based valuations.
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classification could lead to more informative OCF, our findings indicate that such
flexibility impacts the comparability of reported OCF.8
Our study should matter to various audiences. Cash-flow classification
choices available under IFRS, but not under U.S. GAAP, potentially limit the
generalizability of U.S. evidence relying on reported OCF.9 Researchers com-
paring OCF and other performance measures should be interested in the effects
of classification on their estimates (e.g., Bernard and Stober 1989; Sloan 1996;
Ashbaugh and Olsson 2002; Orpurt and Zang 2009; Barton et al. 2010).
With an increasing number of countries permitting or requiring IFRS (De
George et al. 2016), our findings should inform regulators, including the U.S.
SEC, which has considered potential adoption of IFRS (SEC 2011). As IFRS
allows more flexibility than U.S. GAAP, U.S. regulators should note the
variation in firms’ classification choices and the factors associated with those
choices.10 Standard setters can use an understanding of the factors associated
with a firm’s reporting choices when crafting standards that permit alternatives.
In addition, financial statement users may benefit from understanding whether
and how management’s cash flow classification choices relate to reporting
incentives and firm characteristics (Carslaw and Mills 1991).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the motivation and
research design. Section 3 describes our sample selection and presents a
comprehensive description of cash flow classification of interest paid, interest
received, and dividends received. Section 4 reports results of the determinants
of firms’ cash flow classification choices, while Section 5 includes the analysis
of specific consequences of flexibility in classification choice. Section 6
concludes.
2 Motivation and research design
2.1 Determinants of OCF classification choices
We follow Lee (2012) and explore incentives and reporting environment factors related
to reporting higher OCF.11 Incentives for reporting higher OCF relate broadly to capital
access and contracting. Additionally, reporting environment factors affecting classifi-
cation choice include industry and market aspects (analysts’ forecasts and cross-listing).
Because OCF is an important measure in assessing credit and default risk (Beaver
1966; Ohlson 1980; DeFond and Hung 2003), we expect that firms closer to financial
distress will be motivated to report higher OCF. We create a proxy for financial distress
8 In their discussion of reasons for flexibility in financial reporting, Fields et al. (2001) note a potential benefit
of flexibility is the ability for managers to provide a more informative signal; the authors also describe a
pragmatic justification is the cost of eliminating flexibility. Arguably, a pragmatic explanation for flexibility
across IFRS is the increased likelihood of widespread adoption.
9 See Barth et al. (1999), Piotroski (2000), Mohanram (2005), and Penman and Yehuda (2009), among others.
10 Additionally, from a practical standpoint, our identification of what appears to be more than incidental
noncompliance with classification and disclosure guidance could be relevant to standard setters and regulators.
11 Under IFRS, the choice of classification on the statement of cash flows is not required to be the same as the
placement on the firm’s income statement. So income statement classification incentives do not drive cash
flow reporting.
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based on Altman’s Z-score (Altman and Hotchkiss 2006).12 Arguably, firms accessing
equity markets more frequently have a stronger incentive to inflate OCF to increase
their valuation and thus the amount of capital they can raise. Therefore we expect that
these firms will be more likely to classify so as to enhance their reported OCF. Our
proxy for capital market incentives is equity issuances. We expect that, the more firms
opt to access the equity markets, the stronger their incentives to report higher OCF.
Thus we expect a positive relation between equity issues and OCF-increasing classi-
fication choices.
We predict that firms with contracting concerns and costs involved in renegotiating
debt covenants will also seek to report higher OCF. Our proxy for contracting concerns
is leverage, computed as total liabilities divided by total assets. We predict a positive
relation.
We expect that profitability will be associated with OCF-increasing classification
choices. On the one hand, less profitable firms could be more likely to make OCF-
increasing classification choices, managing OCF upward to compensate for weakness
in reported profits. On the other hand, more profitable firms could be likely to make
OCF-enhancing classification choices to reflect better cash flow performance consistent
with income performance. Therefore we do not predict the sign of the association
between profitability and OCF-increasing choices.
We examine three explanatory variables related to the firm’s information environ-
ment: (1) availability of analysts’ cash flow forecasts, (2) industry practice, and (3)
cross-listing in the U.S. The presence of an analyst’s cash flow forecast indicates the
perceived importance of OCF and the commensurate scrutiny of reported OCF
(DeFond and Hung 2003; Call et al. 2009). Evidence also suggests that analysts’ cash
flow forecasts create capital market incentives to report higher OCF (DeFond and Hung
2003; Brown et al. 2013; Call et al. 2013). The perceived importance of OCF and
capital markets incentives imply that firms are more likely to classify interest paid in
financing (i.e., make an OCF-enhancing choice) when analysts have issued cash flow
forecasts. However, other evidence suggests that analysts’ cash flow forecasts help
mitigate earnings management (DeFond and Hung 2003; Wasley and Wu 2006;
DeFond and Hung 2007; McInnis and Collins 2011), essentially serving a deterrent
role. This possible deterrence suggests that firms are less likely to make an OCF-
enhancing classification choice when analysts have issued cash flow forecasts. There-
fore we do not predict the sign of an association between analyst following and OCF-
increasing classification choices.
Our second information-environment variable, industry practice, is relevant to
classification choice because firms could be motivated to increase cross-sectional
comparability by making classification choices consistent with those of their peer
industry group.13 For example, when considering the choice of where to report interest
12 Because of our cross-country and cross-market setting, we use the Altman model which primarily requires
accounting variables. An alternative, the Shumway (2001) distress model, as used by Lee (2012), is developed
for a single market and requires market-driven variables. How to extend the market-driven variables to a cross-
country and cross-market setting is unclear.
13 This relates to the work of Khanna et al. (2004) and Bradshaw and Miller (2008), who show that foreign
firms are more likely to choose accounting methods closer to U.S. GAAP if they cross-list in the United States
or have product market interactions. Wang (2014) documents increased cross-country intra-industry informa-
tion transfers within the EU after IFRS adoption.
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paid, a firm could be hurt by classifying interest paid as operating and thus reporting
comparatively lower OCF when, for example, the majority of its industry peers classify
interest paid as financing. Alternatively, a firm could make a different choice to
distinguish itself from its peers and possibly report higher OCF. In this case, OCF-
increasing choices would not be expected to be associated with industry practice.
Therefore we have no prediction on the sign of the homogeneity of firms’ classification
choices within an industry.
Our third information environment variable pertains to U.S. cross-listing. Bradshaw
et al. (2004) argue that cross-listed firms have stronger incentives to make similar
reporting choices as U.S. companies. Empirically, their data show a positive correlation
between U.S. GAAP conformity and cross-listing. Therefore we expect that cross-listed
firms will be less likely to classify items such as interest paid in financing, which is not
allowed under U.S. GAAP.
We include firm size to capture financial reporting incentives, financial reporting
expertise, and the financial reporting environment of large versus small firms. We do
not have a prediction for its sign. Finally, we include indicator variables for country and
industry. The regression model is as follows:
OCF Classificationi ¼ a0 þ a1 Distress Hii þ a2 Equity Issuesi þ a3 Leverage Hii
þ a4 Profitabilityi þ a5 Analysts Cash Flow Forecasti
þ a6 Industry Homogeneityi þ a7 Cross‐listed in USi
þ a8 Sizei þ ei;
ð1Þ
where:
OCF_Classificationi is either OCF_Reportedt less OCF_Pro forma_USGAAPt or
Interest Paid in Financing;
OCF_Reportedt less OCF_Pro
forma_USGAAPt
= operating cash flows as reported by the firm for year t
less operating cash flows for year t adjusted to include
interest paid, interest received, and dividends received
in operating cash flows if these items are not already
reported in the operating section, averaged over the
sample period;
Interest Paid in Financing = one if the firm classifies interest paid in financing cash
flows as of the last year reported and zero otherwise;
Distress_Hi = one if the firm’s financial distress computed using
Altman’s Z-score is less than 1.81, indicative of high
distress, and zero otherwise;
Equity Issues = percentage change in the firm’s contributed capital
over the sample period;
Leverage_Hi = one if the firm’s ratio of total liabilities over total assets
at the beginning of the fiscal year, averaged over the
sample period, is greater than the median and zero
otherwise;
Profitability = the firm’s net income divided by beginning total
assets, averaged over the sample period;
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Analysts Cash Flow Forecast = one if at least one analyst’s cash flow forecast is
available on IBES and zero otherwise, averaged over
the sample period;
Industry Homogeneity = the percentage of firms within an industry that report
interest paid in financing cash flows, with industry
classifications based on Barth et al. (1998);
Cross-listed in US = one if the firm is cross-listed in the United States and
zero otherwise;
Size = the natural logarithm of the firm’s beginning of year
market capitalization in U.S. dollars, averaged over the
sample period.
Regressions include country, industry, and year controls.
We create one observation per firm summarizing data available during the sample
period to compute the variables in the model. Firms with consistent classification over
time are analyzed separately from firms that changed classification.14 To examine the
relation between the variables described above and the magnitude of the effect of IFRS-
permitted classification choices, we estimate an OLS regression model using the
dependent variable, OCF_Reportedt less OCF_Pro forma_USGAAPt. To examine the
relation between the variables described above and the likelihood of an OCF-enhancing
classification choice, we estimate a logistic regression in which the dependent variable
is Interest Paid in Financing.
2.2 Determinants of OCF-increasing reclassifications
Because cross-sectional variations in the classification within the statement of cash
flows might result from historical legacy for each firm, the subsample of firms that
change classification may offer a cleaner setting to examine the determinants of
classification choice. The Appendix presents an example of one company that changed
its classifications of interest paid and interest received. In 2007, Norse Energy Corp.
ASA, a Norwegian gas explorer and producer, changed its classification of interest paid
to financing from operating. Norse Energy also changed its classification of interest
received from operating to investing. The net effect of these changes was that it
reported positive, rather than negative, operating cash flows in both 2007 and 2008.15
The various classification changes impact reported operating cash flow differently.
To examine determinants of classification choice, we therefore focus on firms that
increased OCF by making the classification change. We compare the OCF-increasing
changers to a control group of firms that did not make a classification change and
specifically nonchanging firms with existing classification choices that have not already
maximized reported OCF. (OCF would be maximized by excluding interest paid from
operating while including both interest received and dividends received in operating.)
Thus we include the nonchanging firms facing a similar decision as the OCF-enhancing
changers; that is, they face the possibility of increasing reported OCF by making a
change in classification.
14 We examine these classification changers separately in Section 2.2.
15 Within our sample, operating cash flows for firms reporting negative operating cash flows would become
positive from an IFRS-allowed reclassification in about 1% of firm-year observations.
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To examine the relation between the determinant variables described in Section 2.1
above and the likelihood of OCF-increasing classification choices, we estimate a logistic
regression similar to Eq. (1) with the dependent variable OCF-Increasing Classification
Change equal to one if the firm increased OCF bymaking a classification change and zero
otherwise. Our expectations on the independent variable signs are similar.
2.3 Consequences: market pricing of the persistence of cash flows
Prior research shows that the cash flow component of earnings is more persistent than
the accrual component. Yet market pricing does not always correctly reflect this
relatively greater persistence (Sloan 1996; Dechow et al. 2008; Pincus et al. 2007).
In the context of cash flow classification, the question remains whether investors
anticipate the persistence of reported operating cash flows and accruals similarly,
regardless of where cash flow items are classified. Our analysis focuses on a compar-
ison of the persistence parameters for accruals and cash flow components of earnings
with the parameters that are implied by stock returns—similar to the approach of Sloan
(1996) and Dechow et al. (2008).
EARNINGStþ1 ¼ α0 þ α1 ACCR Reportedt þ α2 OCF Reportedt þ Controlst
þ υt ð2Þ
Returnstþ1 ¼ β

EARNINGStþ1−α#0 −α
#
1 ACCR Reportedt þ α#2 OCF Reportedt
þ ϕ Controls

þεt;
ð3Þ
where:
EARNINGSt+1 = the amount of net income for year t divided by average of total
assets for year t;
ACCR_Reportedt = the amount of accruals, calculated as net income less reported
operating cash flows for year t divided by average of total assets
for year t;
OCF_Reportedt = the reported amount of operating cash flow for year t divided by
average of total assets for year t;
Controls = Sizet, BMt, and EPt. Sizet = the natural logarithm of the firm’s
market capitalization in U.S. dollars at the beginning of year t.
BMt = the firm’s book-to-market ratio, calculated as the ratio of the
firm’s shareholders’ equity divided by its market capitalization at
the beginning of year t. EPt = the firm’s net income divided by its
market capitalization at the beginning of year t.
Returnst+1 = annual return computed 6 months after year end.
We undertake this analysis separately for the subsample of firms with classification
choices that reflect the flexibility under IFRS (FLEX = 1) and the subsample with
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classification choices similar to those under U.S. GAAP. The coefficients α1 and α2
from the forecasting Eq. (2) indicate the persistence of the two components of earnings:
accruals and cash flow. Prior research has shown that the cash flow component of
earnings is more persistent than the accruals component. We examine whether the
relationship α1 > α2 holds for both subsamples. An impact of differences in classifi-
cation choice would be indicated by differences in comparative persistence parameters
for accruals and OCF.
A comparison is also made between the coefficients from the market pricing
equation (α#1 and α
#
2 ), and from the forecasting equation (α1 and α2). Presence of
the accrual anomaly, for example, is indicated by market underweighting cash flow (α#2
< α2) and overweighting accruals (α
#
1 > α1). In the international context, Pincus et al.
(2007) provide evidence of the accrual anomaly only in certain countries; therefore our
focus is not on whether we find evidence of the accrual anomaly. Rather, we examine
whether the comparative relationships between market pricing of the cash flow and
accrual components differs for the two subsamples.
2.4 Consequences: models of OCF prediction
Next, we examine models of operating cash flow prediction. These models are used
both to develop expected cash flows (Dechow et al. 1998; Roychowdhury 2006; Kim
and Park 2014) and to determine whether accounting measures predict cash flows
(Barth et al. 2001; Givoly et al. 2009; Badertscher et al. 2012). We investigate whether
the cash flow classification choices have different implications for the prediction of
future cash flows. The first model we examine uses past sales and changes in sales to
predict OCF based on Dechow et al. (1998):
OCFtþ1 ¼ γ0 þ γ1 1=TAt þ γ2 St=TAt þ γ3 FLEX  St=TAt þ γ4 ΔSt=TAt
þ γ5 FLEX ΔSt=TAt þ γ6 FLEX þ γ7 Sizet þ γ8 BMt þ γ9 EPt þ εtþ1;
ð4Þ
where:
1/TAt = one divided by the average of total assets for year t;
St/TAt = sales revenue for year t divided by the average of total assets for year t;
FLEX x St/
TAt
= the interaction between the indicator variable FLEX and sales
revenue for year t;
ΔSt /TAt = change in sales revenue from year t-1 to year t divided by the average
of total assets for year t;
FLEX x ΔSt/
TAt
= the interaction between the indicator variable FLEX and change in
annual sales divided by average of total assets for year t.
Regressions include country, industry, and year controls.
In this model, the variables of interest are the FLEX interactions with sales and
changes in sales, γ3 and γ5. The coefficients on these variables will be significant if the
firm’s IFRS classification choices result in different predicted future OCF than would
U.S. GAAP classification choices. Because OCF using FLEX classification choices is
higher on average than OCF using U.S. GAAP classification choices, we expect the
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FLEX interaction coefficients to be positive. If the classification does not relate to the
future OCF, the FLEX interaction coefficients will not be significant. We expect the
coefficients on sales and changes in sales to be positive and significant, consistent with
prior research.
The second prediction model uses past OCF and accruals to predict future OCF
similar to the work of Barth et al. (2001).
OCFtþ1 ¼ φ0 þ φ1 ACCR Reportedt þ φ2 FLEX  ACCR Reportedt þ φ3 OCF Reportedt
þ φ4 FLEX  OCF Reportedt þ φ5 FLEX þ φ6 Sizet þ φ7 BMt þ φ8 EPt þ εtþ1;
ð5Þ
where all variables are as previously defined. These regressions include country,
industry, and year controls.
In this model, the coefficients on the FLEX interactions with accruals and past OCF,
φ2 and φ4, will be significant if the predicted future OCF differs for firms using
classification choices allowable under IFRS but not under U.S. GAAP. On one hand,
we would expect the FLEX interaction coefficients to be positive because OCF using
IFRS classification choices is higher than OCF using U.S. GAAP classifications. On
the other hand, unlike the sales model, the independent variables are past cash flows
and past accruals. Because past cash flows and past accruals capture the firm’s
classification choices in the prediction of future cash flows (using those same classifi-
cation choices), these variables serve as controls for the classification choice also. In
this case, the FLEX interaction coefficients will not be significant.
3 Sample selection and classification choices
3.1 Sample selection
Table 1 presents our initial sample selection procedures. We select our sample of firms
based on data availability in 2008 and then extend the sample to 2012, for a total
sample period of 2005 to 2012.16 We identify all nonfinancial firms in Compustat
Global with key data items for all fiscal years from 2005 to 2008, including total assets,
16 We select our sample based on data availability in 2008 to maximize coverage of firms with at least 3 years
of data following the widespread mandatory adoption of IFRS in Europe starting in 2005. Our focus is on the
post-2005 period because that is the timeframe in which firms in our sample largely faced similar classification
alternatives. Prior to 2005, some firms had already adopted IFRS or were using a home-country GAAP that
permitted IFRS-allowable classifications. Cash flow reporting varied by country in the period before IFRS
adoption. According to the Nobes (2001) report, the following countries’ local GAAP had no specific rules
requiring a cash flow statement: Austria, Belgium, Finland, Italy, and Spain. For Portugal, Nobes (2001)
indicates there were no specific rules except for listed companies; our review of listed companies’ pre-IFRS
annual reports in Portugal indicates that the classifications for interest paid, interest received, and dividends
received were financing, investing, and investing, respectively. The classification requirements were similar to
IFRS in the UK (Davies et al. 1997) and in Germany (Leuz 2000). We were unable to document any local
GAAP requirements for Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, so we reviewed actual annual
reports in the pre-IFRS period. In these reports, the classification used for all three items in those countries was
operating. Nobes (2011) summarizes classification practices related to interest paid in five countries pre-IFRS
as follows: Austria and France—operating; United Kingdom—financing; and Germany and Spain—operating
or financing.
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OCF, and market values. We exclude financial firms because prior research shows that
the informativeness of these firms’ cash flow statements differs from those of nonfi-
nancial firms (Beatty et al. 2016). This selection procedure yields 2815 available firms.
Because databases do not accurately report cash flow classification, we hand collect
the detailed cash flow items from the financial statements. For those countries with 100
available firms or less, we select 100% of the firms. For those countries with over 100
available firms, we select the greater of 100 firms or 30% of the firms with available
data. Because of the large number of firms in the United Kingdom, we selected 15% (or
146) of total potential firms to collect the cash flow data. When sampling from the
available population of firms within a country, we use stratified sampling, first ranking
within country by industry and size (total assets) and then selecting firms. This
selection procedure results in a potential sample of 1204 firms. Our final sample is
reduced to 798 firms primarily because of non-accessible financial statements. The
financial statements are either missing in Mergent Online (94% of cases) or written in
languages other than English, German, or Danish. For the 798 sample firms, we collect
all available data for the period from 2005 to 2012.
Table 1 Sample selection
Country Available
Firmsa
Number
Selectedb
Inaccessible Financial
Statementsc
Number of
Sample Firms
Number of
Sample Obs.d
Austria 52 52 21 31 235
Belgium 67 67 20 47 373
Denmark 67 67 31 36 276
Finland 102 102 59 43 341
France 406 122 16 105 811
Germany 419 127 26 109 742
Italy 206 100 55 45 352
Netherlands 103 103 37 66 485
Norway 103 103 60 43 328
Portugal 38 38 18 20 160
Spain 78 78 20 58 445
Sweden 201 100 33 67 519
United Kingdom 973 146 18 128 979
Total 2,815 1,204 413 798 6,046
a Available firms are initially identified as the nonfinancial firms in Compustat Global that report under IFRS,
are based in Europe, and have key financial data (total assets, operating cash flow, and market value) for fiscal
years 2005 to 2008
b For those countries with 100 firms or less, we select 100% of the firms. For those countries with over 100
firms, we select the greater of 100 firms or 30% of the firms with available data. Because of the large number
of firms in the United Kingdom, we select 15% of the firms, or 146, using stratified sampling
c Firms with inaccessible financial reports consist primarily (94%) of firms whose annual reports are missing
from Mergent Online Database and a smaller number of firms where the annual reports were unavailable in
English, German, or Danish
d For the 798 firms in the resulting sample, we collect all available data for the period 2005 to 2012
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Table 2 presents a description of the size and profitability of the 798 firms in the final
sample and a comparison with other firms in the country that were excluded because of
inaccessible financial statements. As expected, the 798 firms in the final sample are
generally larger (and, on average, more profitable) than the firms that were excluded.
In our data collection, we encountered an unexpected absence of interest paid,
consistent with a possible noncompliance issue with regard to disclosure of interest
paid. 17 For 1347 observations, we could not locate interest paid or where it was
classified on the statement of cash flows after searching the statement of cash flows
and the financial statement footnotes. 18 These firms may not have paid interest or
interest paid may have been immaterial. However, we confirm that 1305 (1325)
observations had interest expense (long-term debt) in Compustat Global and thus likely
paid interest. Based on our review of disclosures by other firms, we determine that, if
the interest paid had been in the investing or financing sections, it would likely have
appeared as a separate line in the section in the statement of cash flows.19 Therefore we
categorize these observations as reporting interest paid in operating for our analyses.
This classification tends to understate the difference between IFRS and U.S. GAAP.
3.2 Description of classification choices
Table 3 describes the classification choices for interest paid, interest received, and
dividends received—by country and industry.20 The number of observations differs in
each panel because not all firms report each item.21
The choice of where to classify interest paid in the statement of cash flows varies by
country (Table 3, panel A). Overall, about 76% of the sample firms classify interest
paid in operating and 23.5% in financing. In our sample, all firms in Finland classify
interest paid in the operating section. Over 95% of all Danish and Swedish firms choose
to classify interest paid in operating. In Portugal, however, about 81% of our sample
firms classify interest paid in financing. About 65% of the observations in Belgium,
17 IAS 7, Statement of Cash Flows, requires separate disclosures of cash flows from interest and dividends
received and interest paid, see paragraph 31 (IASB 1994).
18 For each country, the percentage of nondisclosure of interest paid is as follows: Austria, 19%; Belgium,
27%; Denmark, 37%; Finland, 12%; France, 27%; Germany, 8%; Italy, 23%; Netherlands, 29%; Norway,
27%; Portugal, 14%; Spain, 29%; Sweden, 42%; and the United Kingdom, 11%.
19 A noncompliance issue is also possible with regard to interest received and dividends received. However, we
cannot check these against other financial statements items as easily because Compustat Global has incomplete data.
20 U.S. GAAP also requires that taxes paid be classified as operating and dividends paid as financing. While
IFRS allows discretion in these classifications, data on taxes paid and dividends paid for a substantial subsample
of our firms indicate that over 99% of firms classified these items consistent with U.S. GAAP. Given the
homogeneity of classification choice, we exclude income taxes paid and dividends paid from our analyses.
21 IAS 7, Statement of Cash Flows, requires cash flows from interest and dividends received and paid to be
classified as either operating, investing or financing activities (IAS 7, paragraph 31). Furthermore, IAS 7,
paragraph 33, states: BInterest paid and interest and dividends received are usually classified as operating cash
flows for a financial institution. However, there is no consensus on the classification of these cash flows for
other entities. Interest paid and interest and dividends received may be classified as operating cash flows
because they enter into the determination of profit or loss. Alternatively, interest paid and interest and
dividends received may be classified as financing cash flows and investing cash flows respectively, because
they are costs of obtaining financial resources or returns on investments.^ However, as shown in Table 3, we
find cases where companies do not follow this guidance.
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France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom classify interest paid in operating.
About 0.5% of the sample classifies interest paid as an investing cash flow, inconsistent
with guidance in IAS 7, Statement of Cash Flows, paragraph 33 (IASB 1994).
Classification of interest received also varies as shown in Table 3, panel A. About
60, 31, and 9% classify interest received in operating, investing, and financing,
respectively. Similar to the reporting of interest paid, a very high proportion of the
sample firms in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden classify interest received in operating.
Portugal, the United Kingdom, and Spain have the highest percentage of firms classi-
fying interest received in investing, at 91, 61, and 52%, respectively. About 9% of the
sample firms classify interest received as a financing cash flow, inconsistent with
guidance in IAS 7, Statement of Cash Flows, paragraph 33 (IASB 1994).
Dividends received are primarily classified in operating and investing, at 57 and
40%, respectively, as shown in Table 3, panel A. Over 90% of observations from
Austria and Sweden classify dividends received as operating. In contrast, only 23% of
the Portuguese firms in our sample classify dividends received as operating, with the
remaining 77% classify them as investing. About 3% of the sample classifies dividends
received as a financing cash flow, inconsistent with guidance in IAS 7, Statement of
Cash Flows, paragraph 33.
Panel B of Table 3 shows cash flow classifications by industry.22 Classification
choices for interest paid shows less variation across industries than across countries.
Across all industries, at least two-thirds of firms classify interest paid as operating. The
percentage of the sample classifying interest paid in financing ranges from 13% for
durable goods manufacturers to 33% for both chemicals and services and 34% in other.
For interest received, 71% of durable goods manufacturers and 70% of firms in
textiles, printing, and publishing classify interest received in operating. Firms in the
remaining industries are less likely to classify interest received in operating, with the
lowest frequency for chemicals at 36%. Finally, for dividends received, 81% of firms in
the extractive industries report dividends received in operating, followed by durable
goods manufacturers, with 70% classifying dividends received in operating.
Table 4 presents information on common classification-choice combinations for the
1925 firm-year observations that clearly disclose classification choices for all three items.
The most common classification-choice combination, selected by 42%, is classifying all
items in OCF. The second most common combination is classifying interest paid in
financing and both dividends received and interest received in investing. Table 4, panel
B, reports classifications by section pairs. The diagonals of the section-pair classifications
indicate similarities of classification choices, by item. For example, of the 1310 obser-
vations that classify interest paid as operating, 83% (1093/1310) also classify interest
received as operating. Interest paid and interest received are classified differently by 35%
(671/1925) of observations, implying that net interest is not automatically a determinant
of OCF reported under IFRS. For interest received and dividends received, 32% (624/
1925) of observations classify these two items in the different sections.
The financial statement effects of cash flow classification choices are reflected in a
comparison of reported OCF and pro-forma U.S. GAAP OCF. Specifically, we test
whether the operating, investing, and financing cash flows as reported would differ
22 We follow the industry definitions of Barth et al. (1998).
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Table 4 Classification of interest paid, interest received, and dividends received in the statement of cash
flows, by combination
Panel A: Classification for all items by section combinationsa
Interest Paid Interest Received Dividends Received Obs. Percent
Operating Operating Operating 804 42%
Financing Investing Investing 265 14%
Operating Operating Investing 262 14%
Operating Investing Investing 153 8%
Financing Investing Operating 86 5%
Financing Financing Operating 77 4%
Operating Investing Operating 62 3%
Financing Operating Operating 60 3%
Financing Financing Investing 52 3%
Financing Operating Investing 40 2%
Operating Operating Financing 27 1%
Other Combinations 37 2%
Total 1,925 100%
Panel B: Classification by section pairsa
Interest Paid
Operating Investing Financing Total
Operating 1,093 0 103 1,196
Interest Received Investing 213 18 351 582
Financing 4 0 143 147
1,310 18 597 1,925
Operating 868 11 225 1,104
Dividends Received Investing 415 7 357 779
Financing 27 0 15 42
1,310 18 597 1,925
Interest Received
Operating Investing Financing Total
Operating 862 157 81 1,104
Dividends Received Investing 306 425 52 779
Financing 28 0 14 42
1,196 582 147 1,925
a Includes only those observations where the firm discloses the classification choice for each of the three items
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significantly from cash flows under U.S. GAAP classifications. We adjust as-reported
OCF to include interest paid, interest received, and dividends received. Similarly, we
adjust as-reported investing and financing cash flows to exclude these items.23 Table 5
reports descriptive statistics of the as-reported cash flows and the pro forma U.S.
GAAP cash flows.24 The mean (median) of reported OCF is about 2.4% (3.5%) higher
than it would have been under U.S. GAAP,25 while financing cash flows are lower.
Reported investing cash flow is also higher than it would have been under U.S. GAAP,
reflective of instances in which interest received, dividends, or both received are reported
as investing inflows (which is not allowed under U.S. GAAP). Means and medians of
OCF, investing cash flows, and financing cash flows in the pooled sample differ signif-
icantly between as-reported amounts and pro forma U.S. GAAP amounts. Means of the
pair-wise differences are significantly different for all cash flow components.
4 Results of determinants tests
4.1 OCF classification choices
Table 6, panel A, reports descriptive statistics for variables in the determinants analysis.
26 The number of firms is reduced from 798 to 538 because the following are excluded:
firms that changed their classification choice during the period; firms from Denmark,
Finland, and Sweden (where classification choices for interest paid and interest re-
ceived exhibit little or no variation); and firms missing data to compute all independent
variables.
Results of the regression using differences in OCF as the dependent variable
are presented in the left columns of Table 6, panel B. A higher value of the
differences in OCF variable, OCF_Reported less OCF_Pro forma_USGAAP,
signifies a greater OCF-enhancing impact of classification choices that differ
from the hypothetical benchmark. As expected, we find that Distress_Hi (an
indicator variable signifying greater likelihood of financial distress) is positively
and significantly related to OCF_Reported less OCF_Pro forma_USGAAP. This
finding suggests that financially distressed firms make more OCF-increasing
classification choices. Equity Issues is also positive and significant, suggesting
that firms that access equity markets more frequently opt to make classification
choices to report higher OCF. Leverage_Hi is also significantly positive, indi-
cating that firms with greater leverage are more likely to make classification
choices to show higher OCF. Profitability is significantly negative indicating
that less profitable firms are more likely to make OCF-enhancing classification
23 If values are missing for any cash flow variables, we set them equal to zero in our computations.
24 Variables in Table 5 are winsorized at the top and bottom percentile.
25 Percentage differences are computed as (OCF_Reportedt / OCF_Pro forma_USGAAPt) -1. Untabulated
analysis indicates that more than 80% of the observations with differences between as-reported and pro forma
amounts reported OCF higher than it would have been under U.S. GAAP.
26 The mean of OCF_Reported less OCF_Pro forma_USGAAP in Table 5 and the percentage reporting
interest paid in financing in Table 3, panel A, are slightly different than those reported here because Table 6
summarizes observations by firm rather than firm-year.
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choices. In terms of economic significance, our results indicate that one stan-
dard deviation in the variables Equity Issues and Profitability corresponds to a
change in the dependent var iable (OCF_Reported_less OCF_Pro
forma_USGAAP) of $10.0 million and $7.9 million, respectively (corresponding
to approximately 0.1% of average assets). Similarly, one standard deviation in
the dichotomous variables Distress_Hi and Leverage High corresponds to a
change in OCF_Reported_less OCF_Pro forma_USGAAP of $11.3 million and
$8.3 million, respectively.
Finally, size is negative and significant. Neither Analysts Cash Flow Forecast,
Industry Homogeneity, Cross-listed in US nor any of the industry indicator variables
(not tabulated) are significant. Country indicator variables are all negative and signif-
icant with p-values below 0.01.27
The right columns of Table 6, panel B, present the results of estimating the logistic
regression, where the classification choice to report interest paid in financing is the
dependent variable. Similar to the results of the OLS regression, Leverage_Hi is
positively and significantly associated with the choice to classify interest paid in
financing. This result implies that highly leveraged firms are 44.2% more likely to
make an OCF-increasing classification choice of interest paid as financing. In addition,
27 For country (industry) fixed effects, our baseline in the intercept is Portugal (other industries). We perform
diagnostic tests and find no evidence of multicollinearity. Condition indices are less than 3 for main variables.
Table 5 Comparison of reported to pro forma U.S. GAAP operating, investing, and financing cash flows
Number of firm-year observations 6046 Mean Std.Dev. Median
OCF_Reportedt 0.0882 0.0631 0.0824
INV_Reportedt −0.0666 0.0635 −0.0532
FIN_Reportedt −0.0282 0.0725 −0.0215
OCF_Pro forma_USGAAPt 0.0861 0.0639 0.0796
INV_Pro forma_USGAAPt −0.0679 0.0638 −0.0541
FIN_Pro forma_USGAAPt −0.0157 0.0766 −0.0191
OCF_Reportedt - OCF_Pro forma_USGAAPt 0.0022*** 0.0059 0**
INV_Reportedt - INV_Pro forma_USGAAPt 0.0007*** 0.0017 0*
FIN_Reportedt - FIN_Pro forma_USGAAPt −0.0028*** 0.0062 0***
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Variable Definitions:
OCF_Reportedt = operating cash flows as reported by the firm for year t
OCF_Pro forma_USGAAPt = operating cash flows for year t adjusted to include interest paid, interest
received, and dividends received in operating cash flows if these items are not already reported in the
operating section
INV_Reportedt = investing cash flows as reported by the firm for year t
INV_Pro forma_USGAAPt = investing cash flows for year t adjusted to exclude interest paid, interest
received, and dividends received
FIN_Reportedt = financing cash flows as reported by the firm for year t
FIN_Pro forma_USGAAPt = financing cash flows for year t adjusted to exclude interest paid, interest
received, and dividends received
All firm subscripts are omitted. All variables are scaled by the firm’s total assets
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics and regressions of the difference in operating cash flows and interest paid in
financing on incentives and reporting environment
Panel A: Descriptive statisticsa
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median
Number of firms n = 538
OCF_Reportedt less
OCF_Pro forma_USGAAPt −0.0007 0.0502 0.0003
Interest Paid Reported in Financing 0.2379 0.4262 0.0000
Distress_Hi 0.4329 0.4149 0.3750
Equity Issues 0.1142 0.2099 0.0408
Leverage_Hi 0.5260 0.4998 1
Profitability 0.0394 0.0466 0.0358
Analysts Cash Flow Forecast 0.4830 0.3478 0.5714
Industry Homogeneity 0.7005 0.0700 0.7185
Cross-listed in U.S. 0.0576 0.2332 0
Size 6.5950 1.9596 6.3279
Panel B: Regressions
OCFClassificationi ¼ a0 þ a1 DistressHii þ a2 Equity Issuesi þ a3 LeverageHi þ a4 Profitabilityi
þ a5 Analysts Cash Flow Forecasti þ a6 Industry Homogeneityi
þ a7 Cross−listed in USi þ a8 Sizei þ ei
Dependent Variable OCF_Reportedt less
OCF_Pro forma_USGAAPt
Interest Paid in Financing
Number of firms n = 538 Expected Sign Estimate Std. Error p-value Estimate Std. Error p-value
Intercept −0.4024 0.5978 0.5011 −122.0000 212.4000 0.5656
Distress_Hi + 0.0028 0.0013 0.0156** 0.1535 0.3599 0.3349
Equity Issues + 0.0049 0.0026 0.0297** 0.7526 0.7817 0.1678
Leverage_Hi + 0.0017 0.0009 0.0245** 0.3661 0.2534 0.0743*
Profitability ? −0.0173 0.0104 0.0478** −0.6005 3.0771 0.8453
Analysts Cash Flow Forecast ? 0.0015 0.0013 0.1297 −0.1532 0.3710 0.6797
Industry Homogeneity ? 0.0058 0.0083 0.2416 1.7099 2.9559 0.5630
Cross-listed in US − 0.0005 0.0018 0.7746 −0.8163 0.5666 0.0748*
Size ? −0.0007 0.0003 0.0258** 0.0723 0.0907 0.4254
F-value 4.19 Goodness of Fit Chi-Square p-value
(p-value) <0.0001 Likelihood
Adjusted R2 0.1475 Ratio 71.5 0.0001
Wald 51.1 0.0069
a Sample excludes 99 firms that changed their classification choices during the period (2005 to 2012), firms
from three countries with little variation in the classification of interest paid (Denmark, Finland, and Sweden),
and firms missing data to compute all variables in regression
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. p-values are one-tailed for variables with directional hypotheses and
two-tailed for all others. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Country controls and industry controls are
included
Variable Definitions:
OCF_Reportedt less OCF_Pro forma_USGAAPt = the average by firm of operating cash flows as reported by
the firm for year t less operating cash flows for year t adjusted to include interest paid, interest received, and
dividends received in operating cash flows if these items are not already reported in the operating section
E. A. Gordon et al.
Cross-listed in US is negative and significant, indicating that firms with cross-listings
are more likely to follow the classification choices permitted for US firms. Specifically,
US cross-listed firms in our sample classify interest paid under financing activities with
55.8% lower likelihood than non-US cross-listed firms.28
Neither Distress_Hi, Equity Issues, Profitability, Analysts Cash Flow Forecast,
Industry Homogeneity, Size nor any of the industry indicator variables (not tabulated)
are statistically significant. Country indicator variables are all negative and significant
with p-values lower than 0.01. The finding that country predicts classification choice
while industry does not could reflect firms’ view of their relevant peer group. Despite
political and accounting-standard union, country membership dominates as a predictor
of accounting choice within allowable alternatives.
4.2 Changes in OCF classification choices
In our sample, 99 firms, or 12%, reclassify interest paid, interest received, or
dividends received within the statement of cash flows during the sample period.
Table 7, panel A, shows that the 99 changers represent all countries except Portugal.
The most changers were in the United Kingdom (24) and Germany (17), and the
highest percentages of firms making a change (26%) were in Norway (11 of 43
firms) and Spain (15 of 58 firms). The majority of firms (58%) increase OCF in the
year of the change, increasing OCF by 1.20% (0.78%) at the mean (median).
Companies in all industries, except chemicals, made changes, with the greatest
number in services (14) (not tabulated). Among the reclassifications affecting OCF,
the greatest number move interest paid out of OCF. As shown in Table 7, panel B,
the majority of these firms (49) changed OCF through reclassifying interest out of
OCF.
28 The estimated 44.2% increase and 55.8% decrease arise from e0.3661 = 1.442 and e-0.8163 = 0.442 in the
probit regression in Panel B of Table 6, respectively.
Interest Paid in Financing = one if the firm classifies interest paid in financing cash flows as of the last year
reported and zero otherwise
Distress_Hi = one if the firm’s financial distress computed using Altman’s Z-score is less than 1.81, indicative
of high distress and zero otherwise
Equity Issues = percentage change in the firm’s contributed capital over the sample period
Leverage_Hi = one if the firm’s ratio of total liabilities over total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year,
averaged over the sample period, is greater than the median and zero otherwise
Profitability = the firm’s net income divided by beginning total assets, averaged over the sample period
Analysts Cash Flow Forecast = one if at least one analyst’s cash flow forecast for the period is available on
IBES and zero otherwise, averaged over the sample period
Industry Homogeneity = the percentage of firms within an industry that report interest paid in financing cash
flows, with industry classifications based on Barth et al. (1998)
Cross-listed in US = one if the firm is cross-listed in the United States and zero otherwise
Size = the natural logarithm of the firm’s beginning of year market capitalization in U.S. dollars, averaged over
the sample period
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The various classification changes impact reported operating cash flow differently. To
examine determinants of classification choice, we therefore focus only on the 57 firms that
increased OCF by making the classification change. We compare the OCF-increasing
changers to a control group of firms that did not make an OCF-increasing classification
change and specifically nonchanging firms with existing classification choices that have not
already maximized reported OCF. (OCF would be maximized by excluding interest paid
from operating while including both interest received and dividends received in operating.)
Thus we include the nonchanging firms facing a similar decision as the OCF-enhancing
changers; that is, they face the possibility of increasing reported OCF bymaking a change in
classification. This restriction left 109 firms, all of which are included as a control sample.
In the left side of Table 8, panel A, we compare the 57 OCF-increasing
changer sample to itself over time—before and after the reclassification for
Table 7 Description of firms changing classification of interest paid, interest received, or dividends received
in the statement of cash flows
Panel A: Reclassifications by country, change in OCF, and percentage difference in operating cash flows
in year of change
Change in OCF Results in: OCF-Increasing No Change OCF-Reducing Total firms
Austria 2 0 1 3
Belgium 7 0 0 7
Denmark 0 0 1 1
Finland 0 1 0 1
France 7 0 2 9
Germany 11 4 2 17
Italy 3 0 0 3
Netherlands 4 0 2 6
Norway 8 1 2 11
Spain 5 5 5 15
Sweden 2 0 0 2
United Kingdom 8 8 8 24
Total 57 (58%) 19 (19%) 23 (23%) 99
Percentage difference in operating cash flows in year of change
Mean 0.0120 0 −0.0042 0.0060
Median 0.0078 0 −0.0021 0.0015
Panel B: Classification before and after change, by change in operating cash flow
Interest Paid Interest Received Dividend Received
Firms Percent Firms Percent Firms Percent
Into Operating 7 7% 16 16% 4 4%
Out of Operating 49 49% 27 37% 5 5%
No Change in Operating 43 43% 56 57% 90 91%
99 100% 99 100% 99 100%
*, **, *** denote statistical significance of difference between firms that do not change classification and firms
that change classification (Bchanger^)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 8 Analyses of OCF-enhancing classification change on incentives and reporting environment
Panel A: Comparison of OCF-increasing firms (before and after change) with control sample
OCF-increasing Changer (n = 57 firms)
Pre-Change Post-Changea Control (n = 109 firms)b
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
OCF_Reportedt less
OCF_Pro forma_USGAAPt
* 0.0008 0.0001 0.0118*** 0.0081*** −0.0115 −0.0013***
Interest Paid Reported in
Financing
0.0414 0 0.7716*** 1*** 0* 0**
Distress_Hi 0.4438 0.3333 0.4708 0.2857 0.3562 0.1250
Equity Issues 0.2500 0.1380 0.1236*** 0.0734* 0.1673* 0.0926
Leverage_Hi 0.5263 1 0.5790 1 0.4954 0
Profitability 0.0587 0.0447 0.0316* 0.0405* 0.0457 0.0447
Analysts Cash Flow
Forecast
0.2357 0 0.5937*** 0.6667*** 0.4791*** 0.6000***
Industry Homogeneity 0.6901 0.6976 0.6901 0.6976 0.6975 0.7185
Cross-listed in US 0.0175 0 0.0175 0 0.0275 0*
Size 6.9109 6.6955 6.9597 6.6955 6.6029 zz6.123
Panel B: Dependent variable: OCF-increasing classification change
OCF‐increasing ClassificationChangei ¼ a0 þ a1 DistressHii þ a2 Equity Issuesi þ a3 LeverageHii
þ a4 Profitabilityi þ a5 Analysts Cash Flow Forecasti
þ a6 Industry Homogeneityi þ a7 Cross‐listed in USi þ a8 Sizei þ ei
Expected
Sign
Estimate Std. Error p-value
(n = 166 firms)c
Intercept 10.3129 7.1011 0.1464
Distress_Hi + 0.7159 0.6742 0.1442
Equity Issues + 1.3219 0.9750 0.0876*
Leverage_Hi + −0.2031 0.4951 0.3408
Profitability ? 5.4415 3.4679 0.1166
Analysts Cash Flow
Forecast
? −3.1941 0.8008 <.0001***
Industry Homogeneity ? −0.1657 0.0961 0.0847*
Cross-listed in US − −2.7321 1.8925 0.0744*
Size ? 0.1707 0.1985 0.3900
Goodness of Fit Chi-Square p-value
Likelihood Ratio 68.0 0.0001
Wald 31.7 0.3319
a Compares statistical significance of means and medians of pre-change and post-change variables
b Compares statistical significance of means and medians of pre-change and control samples
c Consists of 57 firms that made an OCF-increasing change and 109 firms that are not currently maximizing
reported OCF but did not make a classification change
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. p-values are one-tailed for variables with directional hypotheses and
two-tailed for all others. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Country controls and industry controls are
included
Variable Definitions: OCF-increasing classification change = one if a firm made an OCF-increasing classi-
fication firm and zero otherwise. See Table 6 for the remaining variable definitions
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variables similar to those in the cross-sectional regression. For variables created
as averages over the sample period, averages are based on the periods before and
after the reclassification. The significantly positive differences in the means and
medians of the difference in OCF (reported minus pro forma) and interest paid
reported in financing are a function of the criteria for inclusion as an OCF-
increasing changer. In addition, we find that equity issues and analysts’ forecast
coverage are higher in the period after the change. The mean and median
profitability of changers is significantly lower after the change.
On the right side of Table 8, panel A, we compare the 57 OCF-increasing
changers to the control sample. We find significant differences in the means,
medians or both of the difference in OCF (reported minus pro forma), interest
paid reported in financing, equity issues, analysts’ forecast coverage, cross-
listed in the US, and industry.
Table 8, panel B, presents results of a logistic regression with the dependent
variable OCF-Increasing Classification Change equal to one if the firm in-
creased OCF by making a classification change and zero otherwise. Results
indicate that firms with greater equity issuance are more likely to make OCF-
increasing choices. Any valuation enhancement related to higher reported OCF
would increase equity issuance proceeds, but the relation is not direct, partic-
ularly as equity issuance is measured historically. We find that analyst forecast
coverage is negatively associated with changing, consistent with analysts’ cash
flow forecasts serving some deterrent role. Similarly, those firms that have
greater industry homogeneity and are cross-listed in the US are less likely to
make an OCF-increasing classification change. These firms appear to be
responding to external forces to maintain current OCF reporting choices.
4.3 Additional analyses and variables
Data on auditors indicate that 88% of our full sample of 798 firms are audited by a
Big Four auditor (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, or PricewaterhouseCoopers).
To consider the possibility that classification choice is driven by the auditor, we
re-estimate our regressions including an indicator variable for each of these
auditors. Results show that none of the indicator variables are significant (not
tabulated). Thus we do not find evidence that classification choice is associated
with auditor choice.
We also examine the effect of including the following other variables, but none are
significant: credit risk, average market-to-book ratio, average returns, an indicator
variable for earnings that are just positive, variability of OCF (computed as the standard
deviation of the firm’s OCF over the sample period), and capital intensity, which
captures structure of operations and potential financing needs.
When we include only observations with interest paid located on the face of or in the
footnotes to the financial statements (about 70% of the sample), regression results
resemble the overall reported results.
We also reviewed the classification choices of a larger set of cross-listed firms to
determine whether the results on the cross-listing variable are generalizable to a broader
set of cross-listing firms. We collected data on 83 European Union cross-listed firms in
2006 (including some of the 40 cross-listed firms in our sample), and we find the
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classification choice for interest paid resembles our overall sample: 78% reporting in
operating and 22% in financing.
5 Results of consequences of flexibility in OCF classification
5.1 Market pricing of the persistence of cash flows
Results of the analysis comparing the persistence parameters for accruals and
cash flow components of earnings are presented in Table 9. For both groups,
accruals are significantly less persistent than operating cash flows, similar to
findings of Sloan (1996) and Dechow et al. (2008). The lower persistence of
accruals is indicated by the FLEX group’s persistence parameter (i.e., forecast-
ing coefficient) for accruals of 0.4302, compared to 0.6788 for operating cash
flow (panel A). For the non-FLEX group, persistence parameters are 0.4339 and
0.6851 for accruals and operating cash flow, respectively (panel B).
The implications of the market-implied coefficients, however, differ for the two
groups. The FLEX subsample’s market-implied persistence of accruals (0.2325) is
much lower than the persistence parameter (0.4302), and the market-implied persis-
tence of cash flow (0.1922) is also much lower than the persistence parameter (0.6788),
indicating underpricing of both components. 29 (Pincus et al. (2007) similarly find
underweighting of both accruals and operating cash flows in four of the countries they
study, two of which are European.) However, the FLEX subsample’s market-implied
persistence of accruals (0.2325) exceeds the market-implied persistence of operating
cash flow (0.1922), indicating a higher pricing for accruals relative to cash flow.
In contrast, the non-FLEX subsample’s market-implied persistence of accruals
(0.4020) is roughly equivalent (p = 0.6644) to the persistence parameter of accruals
(0.4339) in the forecasting equation, while the market-implied persistence of cash flow
(0.4039) is lower than the persistence parameter (0.6851), indicating underpricing only
of the cash flow component. (Pincus et al. (2007) similarly find underweighting of OCF
but not accruals in eight of the countries they study, five of which are European.)
Furthermore, the market-implied coefficient of accruals is also roughly equivalent to
the market-implied coefficient of cash flow. In other words, unlike the FLEX sub-
sample, the evidence does not reveal higher pricing for accruals relative to cash flow.
Overall, these results could be interpreted to suggest that investors value accruals more
highly than cash flow—but only for the FLEX subsample.
5.2 Models of OCF prediction
Table 10 presents regression results for two cash flow prediction models.30 Analyses
and inferences are based on prediction of OCF as reported on the statement of cash
29 Untabulated analysis indicates similar underpricing of both components for the subsample of FLEX
observations making OCF-increasing classification choices but not for the OCF-decreasing group.
30 In the past sales model in Table 10, panel A, the number of observations in the regressions, 4,006, is lower
than the 6,046 firm-year observations in the total sample due to inclusion of lagged variables and changes in
the lagged variables.
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flows, not prediction of real economic OCF, which is unobservable. In panel A,
operating cash flows are regressed on prior year’s sales and change in sales. The
coefficients on the interaction terms with sales and change in sales are both positive
and significant, implying that the classification choices matter when predicting future
OCF. The positive sign is consistent with OCF using IFRS classification choice being
higher on average that OCF using U.S. GAAP classification choices. The estimated
Table 9 Simultaneous estimation of persistence parameters for accruals and operating cash flow and the
parameters implied by stock returns, for subsamples making alternative classification choices
EARNINGStþ1 ¼ α0 þ α1 ACCR Reportedt þ α2 OCF Reportedt þ Controlst þ υt
Returnstþ1 ¼ β EARNINGStþ1−α#0 −α#1 ACCR Reportedt þ α#2 OCF Reportedt þ ϕ Controlst
 
þ εt
Forecasting Coefficients Valuation Coefficients
Parameter Coefficient estimate
(standard error)
Parameter Coefficient estimate
(standard error)
Test of market efficiency
ai = ai
#
Wald statistic (p-value)
Panel A: FLEX = 1 (n = 1,425)
a1 0.4302 α
#
1 0.2325 3.5127
(0.0273) (0.1019) (0.0609)**
a2 0.6788 α
#
2 0.1922 19.8111
(0.0259) (0.1062) (0.0000)***
β 1.9164
(0.1862)
Controlsa Yes Controls Yes
Panel B. FLEX = 0 (n = 2581)
a1 0.4339 α
#
1 0.4020 0.1882
(0.0233) (0.0699) (0.6644)
a2 0.6851 α
#
2 0.4039 17.3206
(0.0207) (0.0643) (0.0000)***
β 2.1548
(0.1271)
Controlsa Yes Controls Yes
aControlst Control variables included are: Sizet, BMt, and EPt
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. p-values are two-tailed
Variable Definitions:
EARNINGSt+1 = net income for year t divided by average total assets for year t
ACCR_Reportedt = the amount of accruals, calculated as net income less reported operating cash flows for
year t divided by average total assets for year t
OCF_Reportedt = the reported amount of operating cash flow for year t divided by average total assets for year t
Returnst+1 = annual return computed 6 months after year end
Sizet = the natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization in U.S. dollars at the beginning of year t
BMt = the firm’s book-to-market ratio, calculated as the ratio of the firm’s shareholders’ equity divided by its
market capitalization at the beginning of year t
EPt = the firm’s net income divided by its market capitalization at the beginning of year t
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Table 10 Regressions with reported future operating cash flows as dependent variable
Estimate Std. Error p-value
Panel A: Regression of future operating cash flows on sales and change in sales
OCFtþ1 ¼ γ0 þ γ11=TAt þ γ2St=TAt þ γ3FLEX  St=TAt þ γ4ΔSt=TAt þγ5FLEX ΔSt=TAt
þ γ6FLEX þ γ7Sizet þ γ8BMt þ γ9EPt þ εtþ1
(n = 4006a)
Intercept 0.0543 0.0180 0.0025***
1/TAt −0.3690 0.1158 0.0015***
St/TAt 0.0963 0.0630 0.0634*
FLEX x St/TAt 0.1307 0.0794 0.0998*
ΔSt/TAt −0.0161 0.0552 0.7709
FLEX x ΔSt/TAt 0.0932 0.0660 0.0791*
FLEX 0.0267 0.0100 0.0077***
Sizet 0.0008 0.0005 0.0632*
BMt −0.0152 0.0012 <.0001***
EPt 0.1309 0.0074 <.0001***
F-value 15.88
(p-value) <0.0001
R2 0.1351
Panel B: Regression of future operating cash flows on current accruals and cash flows
OCFtþ1 ¼ φ0 þ φ1AACR Reportedt þ φ2FLEX  ACCR Reportedt þ φ3OCF Reportedt þ φ4FLEX
OCF Reportedt þ φ5FLEX þ φ6Sizet þ φ7 þ BMt þ φ8EPt þ εtþ
(n = 5128 a)
Intercept 0.0251 0.0056 <.0001***
ACCR_Reportedt 0.2373 0.0165 <.0001***
FLEX x ACCR_Reportedt 0.0019 0.0164 0.9098
OCF_Reportedt 0.7809 0.0148 <.0001***
FLEX x OCF_Reportedt 0.0230 0.0191 0.2302
FLEX −0.0019 0.0023 0.4236
Sizet 0.0007 0.0004 0.0906*
BMt −0.0015 0.0009 0.0935*
EPt 0.0067 0.0058 0.2493
F-value 141.21
(p-value) <0.0001
R2 0.5132
a The number of observations is based on the availability of accounting and market data to compute variables,
including lagged variables, in the model
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. p-values are two-tailed. Errors are clustered by firm. Regressions include
country, industry, and year controls
Variable definitions:
1/TAt = one divided by average total assets for year t
St /TAt = sales revenue for year t divided by average total assets
FLEX x St /TAt is the interaction between the indicator variable FLEX and sales revenue for year t
ΔSt /TAt is change in annual sales revenue from year t-1 to year t divided by average total assets
FLEX xΔSt /TAt is the interaction between the indicator variable FLEX and change in annual sales revenue for
year t divided by average total assets
See Table 9 for remaining variable definitions
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coefficient on sales is positive and significant as expected. However, the coefficient on
changes in sales is not significant.
In the past cash flows and accruals models in Table 10, panel B, the FLEX
interaction with OCF and accruals is not significant, indicating that the classification
choices do not contribute to the prediction of future OCF in this model. This finding is
consistent with past OCF and accruals also controlling for the firm’s classification
choices. Furthermore, this finding suggests that this type of model may be more useful
in the international context in which flexibility in cash flow classification exists.
5.3 Additional analyses
Our market tests do not provide evidence consistent with the accrual anomaly. Pincus
et al. (2007) provide evidence that the accrual anomaly occurs in common law
countries and not code law countries. Given that code law countries comprise 12 of
the 13 countries in our sample, this finding is consistent. In the United Kingdom, the
only common law country in our sample, we also find no evidence of the accrual
anomaly. We explore whether the results of our market tests are sensitive to model
specification. We find that results of our market pricing analysis in Table 9 are sensitive
to model specification. 31 In particular, when the forecasting and valuation models
exclude firm-specific control variables (Sizet, BMt, and EPt), the overall conclusions
are similar for both subsamples. These conclusions, based on untabulated results
excluding the control variables, are as follows. 1) Accruals are significantly less
persistent than operating cash flows as in the base analysis. 2) The market-implied
coefficients reflect underpricing of both accruals and operating cash flow as in the base
analysis. 3) But the comparative magnitude of the market-implied coefficients shows
no indication of the accrual anomaly (i.e., the coefficient on accruals does not exceed
the coefficient on operating cash flow), regardless of the firm’s cash-flow classification
choice.
6 Conclusion
Cash flow, and particularly OCF, is used in business valuation and contracting.
However, OCF can be measured differently under IFRS and U.S. GAAP
because of classification alternatives available only under IFRS. While previous
international accounting research focuses on IFRS versus U.S. GAAP differ-
ences in earnings and shareholders’ equity, little attention has been given to
potential differences in OCF under the two sets of standards.
Using an international setting, we build on and extend certain findings from the
U.S.-only setting of Lee (2012). We find that firms with a higher likelihood of financial
distress as well as those that issue more equity, have higher leverage, and are less
profitable are more likely to make OCF-increasing classification choices. Our findings
further suggest that cross-listed firms tend to make classification choices consistent
31 The exploration of the accrual anomaly for various subpopulations is an area for potential future research.
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with U.S. GAAP. Firms are more likely to make OCF-increasing classification changes
when they have issued equity and less likely to change when they are followed by
analysts, have more peers making similar choices, and are cross-listed in the U.S.
Overall, OCF-enhancing classification choices are associated with both financial and
informational factors.
The flexibility under IFRS also has consequences. We provide evidence that
the market’s assessment of the persistence of OCF and accruals differs for
groups of firms making different classification choices. However, our results
are sensitive to model specification. We also show that results of certain OCF
prediction models differ for firms making different classification choices. When
OCF prediction is based on past sales, results differ for firms making alterna-
tive classification choices. However, when OCF prediction is based on past
OCF and accruals, results do not differ significantly for firms making alterna-
tive classification choices, likely because past OCF and accruals also control for
firms’ classification choices. Overall, the consequences of classification choices,
such as market reaction to OCF surprise/earnings surprise around earnings
announcements, offer an avenue for future research.
Our paper contributes to the international accounting literature exploring the
consequences of IFRS adoption and reporting. Given the recent adoption of
IFRS in more than 120 countries and the consideration of IFRS by U.S.
regulators, our evidence is important. Our results show that cash flow classifi-
cation flexibility within IFRS creates a noncomparability that is absent under
the more rigid requirements of U.S. GAAP. Flexibility in classification of cash
flow items introduces potential noncomparability into measurement of widely
used metrics, such as accruals and free cash flow. Understanding the impact of
noncomparability under IFRS on such metrics will facilitate appropriate infer-
ences from research incorporating these metrics.
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Appendix
EXAMPLE OF EFFECTS OF RECLASSIFICATION ON OPERATING CASH
FLOWS
Norse Energy Corp. ASA, a Norwegian gas explorer and producer, changed its
classifications of interest paid and interest received in 2007. It changed its classification
of interest paid to financing from operating. It changed its classification of interest
Flexibility in cash-flow classification under IFRS
received to investing from operating. The net effect of these changes was to report
positive, rather than negative, operating cash flows in both 2007 and 2008. The
example below illustrates the computation of the net effect of the reclassifications.
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